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“Overlapping coalitions, bargaining, and networks”: The paper develops a new bargaining game of which the outcome is an overlapping coalition structure. Equilibrium does not always exist in pure strategies for such a game, but it is shown that it always exists with a mild degree of mixed strategies. Conditions for a complete duality between networks and overlapping coalitions are derived providing a new rationale for the sequential formation of networks. Link.

“Socioeconomic determinants of the mobile money adoption process: the case of Togo”, with Komivi Afawubo, Mawuli K. Couchoro, and Tchapo Gbandi: The paper identifies the socioeconomic factors that determine the adoption of the usage of mobile money services in Togo. Departing from the traditional literature which considers the adoption of mobile money as a one-shot phenomenon, this paper models the adoption of mobile money as a five-step process and identifies the likelihood of its adoption based on an Ordered Logit model. It is found that social groups, including religious groups and student associations, are powerful vehicles for the adoption of mobile money in Togo. In addition, the ability to read and write, and being a customer of a bank or a Microfinance Institution (MFI) positively influence the mobile money adoption process. In contrast, being unemployed decreases the likelihood to adopt mobile money. Link.

“Stability in informal insurances: an approach by networks and overlapping coalitions”: Based on empirical facts, the paper built a model of informal insurances where risk-sharing groups are overlapping homogenous coalitions, originating from networks of historical trust relationships. A general folk theorem under uncertainty is derived and the determinants of the stability of informal insurances are identified. Results are robust to social norms and theoretical explanations for empirical findings such as the puzzle that rich families in rural economies in developing countries consume less are provided. The model bridges the two traditional approaches of clubs and bilateral agreements. Link.

“A recursive core for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions”: This paper develops an extension of the recursive core to the setting of overlapping coalitions. It is shown that the cooperative game theoretical traditional way of separating a deviant coalition from the game played by the ones left behind is no more satisfactory. A new paradigm is therefore introduced that allowed the formation of the overlapping coalition structure core whose allocations are Pareto-efficient. Link.

Messan Agbaglah

Messan Agbaglah received his PhD in economics from the University of Montreal, Canada, in 2013. His research interests comprise theoretical microeconomics (e.g., game theory, theory of formation of coalitions) and applications to development institutions (e.g., informal insurance, mobile money). Messan worked as a professor of economics at the University of Sherbrooke, Canada, (2012-2015) and successively as a Researcher, Strategic Planner, and Research Advisor at the Labour Program in the federal government of Canada (2015-2017).

magbaglah@africanschoolofeconomics.com